Summary

This paper builds on a story Tom Sargent told in his book The conquest of American inflation.
That book seeks to explain the rise and fall of inflation in the United States and provides a cautionary tale for those who are confident that inflation will not rise again in the future. The story involves a monetary authority that sets policy believing, incorrectly, that higher inflation can buy permanently lower unemployment. The monetary authority takes a model like this to the data and updates its estimates of this long-run trade-off. In the model, inflation is high when high inflation appears to buy lower unemployment: when the benefits of high inflation appear greatest.
Inflation is low when it appears to the central bank that unemployment is unrelated to inflation.
Unbeknownst to the policymaker in this model, only surprises in inflation -differences between what was expected by the private sector in the model, and the outturn -affect unemployment.
Periodically, unobserved shocks come along that offset 'mistakes' that the central bank makes setting inflation, and this makes it look to the central bank as though inflation has no effect on unemployment. So the central bank chooses low inflation.
Our modification to this story is to adapt Sargent's model to explain why the volatility of inflation seems to be high when the level of inflation is high, and vice versa, a matter on which the original model is necessarily silent. We add a shock to the model which the central bank sees, but to which the private sector cannot react, and which the central bank seeks to offset using its inflation policy.
This shock brings the model a little closer to reality, since it is likely that monetary policy has in the past sought to help stabilise inflation and the macroeconomy. In our model, at times when the central bank thinks the benefits to high average inflation are greatest, it also thinks it can use inflation to stabilise unemployment more effectively, and therefore chooses not only high inflation, but also volatile inflation. Conversely, when it appears to the monetary authority that high inflation does not buy any reduction in long-run unemployment (when the trade-off appears to be vertical), it chooses not only low inflation, as in the original Sargent model, but also more stable inflation, since it sees no point in trying to use inflation to offset the shock to unemployment.
We also document that escapes from high and volatile inflation to low and stable inflation in our model are less likely if the variance of the observed shock to unemployment is high. A rough intuition for this effect is that the more variable is the observed shock to unemployment, the more variable the central bank chooses inflation to be. This generates larger inflation surprises, and those surprises translate into larger movements in unemployment. What the central bank sees is a strong correlation between inflation itself and unemployment, making the long-run trade-off look promising for the central bank, and that reinforces its belief in the benefits of high and volatile inflation (which it incorrectly thinks will translate into low unemployment). The only thing that can undo this correlation in the model is the unobserved shock to unemployment. If this shock is large enough, then from time to time, it can offset the effect of an inflation surprise on unemployment and eliminate the correlation the central bank sees between inflation and unemployment. But the more variable is the observed shock relative to the unobserved shock, the less powerful the latter is in wiping out this correlation. If we were to take this model to the real world, then this feature would suggest that part of the reason inflation became lower and more stable was because the volatility of observed shocks to the supply side fell.
Taken literally, the model has the rather gloomy prediction for the future that there will forever be bouts of high and volatile inflation. But what our model misses out, like the Sargent model it derives from, is the revolution in the institutional design and economic understanding underpinning monetary policy that took place in recent decades.
Introduction
The current macroeconomic environment of low and stable inflation has prompted both academics and central bankers to address the question of why inflation was so high and volatile in developed economies during the 1970s. Providing a satisfactory answer represents a substantial challenge, since the contrast between the present and the past is stark. Average UK inflation came down from 12.6% in the 1970s, to 2.5% in the post inflation-targeting era. In the United States inflation averaged 7.1% in the 1970s and 2.9% in the 1990s. The consensus among econometricians is that inflation volatility (as measured by its conditional variance) also fell.
(1) Any candidate answer at least has to answer the following questions:
(i) Why did inflation rise and fall from the 1960s to the 1990s?
(ii) Why did inflation volatility also rise and fall over the same period?
The publication of The conquest of American inflation by Tom Sargent in 1999 began a literature that attempts to explain the inflation of the 1970s purely in terms of changing government beliefs.
The rise in inflation is attributed to the discovery of the Phillips curve relationship, which tempted the authorities to increase inflation in a bid to reduce unemployment. High inflation was then sustained by overly pessimistic beliefs about how much unemployment would rise if inflation were to be brought down, which deluded the authorities into believing its high-inflation policy was effective in reducing unemployment. This continued until a rare sequence of shocks led the authorities to abandon their high-inflation policy and adopt a more realistic view of unemployment and policy effectiveness. In the terminology of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) , the fall in inflation in the 1980s is an example of an escape dynamic.
The explanation proposed by Sargent (1999) is both elegant and a fine application of simple yet powerful theory. However, it only provides a partial answer to question (i) of why inflation rose and fell, and is silent on question (ii) concerning the observed changes in inflation volatility. If the rise and fall in inflation is to be explained by changing beliefs, then it is natural to ask why the (1) Econometricians typically estimate GARCH or stochastic volatility models, and find that the level and conditional volatility of inflation are positively correlated. See Giordani and Söderlind (2003) for a recent innovative study combing this approach with data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
(2) Other recent contributions that attempt to rationalise the past through formal modelling of changing government beliefs include Cogley and Sargent (2004) , Orphanides (2003) , Primiceri (2005) and Reis (2003) .
particular sequence of shocks needed to provoke the fall in inflation occurred at the time it did in the 1980s. The escape dynamic literature pioneered by Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) identifies the series of shocks needed to change beliefs and trigger the fall, but offers little guidance as to when they are likely to occur. In answer to the question about changes in inflation volatility, Sargent (1999) is mute because his and subsequent work implies that the volatility of inflation should be constant when conditioned on beliefs.
The primary aim of this paper is to reconcile the observed rise and fall in inflation volatility with a simple model of changing central bank beliefs. The strategy we employ is to unwind one of the simplifications in Sargent (1999) , and study a model in which the authorities can use stabilisation policy to cushion the effects of some of the shocks that hit the economy. To this end, we assume the presence of frictions in the economy that prevent private agents from optimally adjusting to shocks. This opens the door to stabilisation policy if we further assume that the authorities are not constrained by frictions and so can react to some of the shocks. Our motivation for generalising the Sargent (1999) story in this way is the long tradition of monetary policy being used to stabilise the economy, as typified by Phelps and Taylor (1977) .
Re-introducing a motive for stabilisation policy creates a natural link between the level and volatility of inflation. In our story, the discovery of the Phillips curve not only leads to a higher level of inflation but also creates greater inflation volatility as the authorities begin to use changes in inflation to offset shocks and stabilise the economy. In the period when inflation is high, the delusion that inflation is effective in reducing unemployment translates into a strong desire for the authorities also to use stabilisation policy to offset shocks, so the volatility of inflation remains high. When the escape to low inflation eventually occurs, the more realistic view of policy effectiveness adopted by the authorities leads to a reining in of stabilisation policy, which naturally leads to a concurrent fall in the volatility of inflation.
As a corollary to our analysis, we are also able to shed some light on the question of why the escape to low inflation occurred at the time it did in the 1980s. The insight we offer is that escapes are much more likely to happen in a period when there are relatively few shocks that can be offset 
Model
Our model extends that of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) by adding a motivation for stabilisation policy. We therefore retain the key features of their model, but follow Phelps and Taylor (1977) and introduce price-setting frictions and a new unemployment shock W 3 to which the authorities can react. Chart 1 shows the timing of our model. The presence of frictions forces private agents to set prices in advance, based on an expectationx of policy formed before the shock is known. The authorities are not bound to set policy in advance: policy x can react to the shock and attempt to stabilise the economy.
In the remainder of this section we sketch out the key features of our model in detail: the actual structure of the economy, the structure of the economy perceived by the authorities, and the mechanisms by which the authorities set policy and updates their beliefs. The structure of the economy is described by the expectations-augmented Phillips curve (2.1): below:
Inflation π n is therefore equal to the level x n intended by the government, plus a control error W 2n .
We refer to x n as intended inflation.
Perceived structure of the economy
Following Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002), we assume that the authorities do not know the actual structure of the economy. Rather, they have an approximating model which allows for the possibility of a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. This approximating model is summarised by (2.3)-(2.4).
We permit the authorities to correctly perceive the effect on employment of our new shock W 3n .
Although the approximating model is correctly specified in this respect, it remains otherwise misspecified since it assumes a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, when in reality only unexpected inflation matters for unemployment. η n is an approximation error, capturing any fluctuations in unemployment the government fails to explain by its perceived structure of the economy.
The monetary authority estimates the perceived structure of the economy using standard econometric techniques. This process is captured by (2.5) -(2.8) below.
These equations give recursive formulae for discounted least squares estimation of the coefficients in equation (2.3), with γ n a 2 × 1 vector of current parameter estimates [γ 0n γ 1n ] . ε is the discount factor or gain, g γ n , ξ n is the forecast error, and R n is a 2 × 2 matrix measuring the precision of the current estimates. The function M(γ n ) is introduced to ease notation. Our assumption that the monetary authority correctly perceives the effect of the new unemployment shock means that W 3n does not appear in the definition of the forecast error (2.7), rendering our recursive estimation scheme identical to that in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) .
In discounting past data, the monetary authority implicitly allows for the possibility of structural change, even though no such change is explicitly articulated within the model. Discounting with the gain ε gives an exponentially decreasing weight to past data.
Monetary policy
The objective of monetary policy is to minimise the objective function (2.9) below:
E denotes the expectations operator induced by the perceived structure of the economy (2.3) and (2.4). The policymaker is penalised quadratically whenever unemployment or inflation deviates from zero. δ is a discount factor.
A fully optimal government policy would set intended inflation x n to minimise the objective function (2.9), subject to the perceived structure of the economy ( believes its current best estimate of the perceived structure is both precise and correct. The anticipated utility policy consequently sets intended inflation x n to solve the static optimisation problem (2.10).
The solution to optimisation problem (2.10) is the anticipated utility policy (2.11), in which intended inflation x n leans against the wind created by γ 0n and our new shock W 3n . The extent to which policy leans against the wind depends on the current estimate γ 1n of the trade-off parameter ( 3) The assumption of anticipated utility maximisation is supported by Kreps (1998) , who argues that dynamic problems under uncertainty are fundamentally different to static ones, so require a fundamentally different decision criterion. Also in support is the paper of Cogley, Colacito and Sargent (2005) , which suggests that the difference between fully optimal and anticipated utility policies is likely to be small in any case.
in the perceived structure of the economy.
Our earlier assumption of price-setting frictions forces private agents to set prices on the expected outcome of policy (2.11). According to our timing protocol, prices are set before our new shock is known, so W 3n drops out of expectations. Expected inflationx n is then given by equation (2.12).
(2.12)
Rising inflation and inflation volatility
The first question to address with our model is the rise in inflation and inflation volatility observed in the 1960s and 1970s. Sargent (1999) attributes the increase in inflation to the evolution in government beliefs after the discovery of the Phillips curve. Our model follows Sargent's line, but demonstrates that rising inflation volatility is a natural consequence of the same changes in the beliefs of the authorities that caused higher inflation, once we re-introduce a motive for stabilisation policy. We derive the results in this section using stochastic approximation techniques to analyse the mean dynamics of the continuous time analogue of our model, thereby tracing out the normal (expected) evolution of monetary policy makers' beliefs after the Phillips curve is discovered. In Section 5 we present supporting evidence from simulations of the discrete time model.
Mean dynamics
The derivation of the mean dynamics of our model begins by re-writing the recursive estimation scheme (2.5) and (2.6) as equations (3.1) and (3.2).
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) resemble a discrete-time approximation of a continuous time process perturbed by shocks ξ n . If we take the limit as ε → 0, the approximation error tends to zero and a weak law of large numbers ensures that the stochastic element become negligible. In the limit, the mean dynamics of the model can therefore be described by a pair of ordinary differential equations (3.3) and (3.4), whereḡ (γ ) is the expected value of g (γ , ξ) andM(γ ) is the expected value of M. A proof of this is contained in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) .
Expressions forḡ (γ ) andM(γ ) can be obtained by taking expectations of the forecast error (2.7) and the precision matrix (2.8), conditional on the true structure of the economy (2.1) -(2.2) and monetary policy (2.11). The mean dynamics for our model are then given by equations (3.5) and (3.6).γ
The presence of our new shock changes the mean dynamics of the model. In equations (3.5) and (3.6), the new shock W 3 plays a similar role through σ 3 as the inflation control error W 2 does through σ 2 . Intuitively, the shocks have similar effects because they both create unexpected movements in inflation and unemployment. W 2 does so directly, since it is an unpredictable control error. W 3 does so indirectly, since it prompts stabilisation actions that cannot be predicted at the time private agents form their expectations.
Properties of mean dynamics
The next step in the analysis is to examine how our new shock affects the properties of mean dynamics. For mean dynamics to converge requires the existence of a locally asymptotically stable fixed point of the system of ordinary differential equations (3.5) -(3.6). We begin by checking existence, noting that any fixed point must satisfy the restrictionγ =Ṙ = 0. Applying this restriction to the system of ordinary differential equations, we obtain the unique fixed point defined by equations (3.7) and (3.8).γ
The level and volatility of unemployment and inflation at the fixed point are given by equations (3.9) -(3.12).Ū = u (3.9) π = uθ (3.10)
(3.12)
The fixed point in our model has the same belief pair γ , unemployment levelŪ , and inflation level π as the self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) . The monetary authority believes that higher inflation is effective in reducing unemployment (γ 1 = −θ), and is over-pessimistic about how high unemployment would be if inflation were to be brought down
. Taken together, these beliefs delude the monetary authority into continuing to follow a high-inflation policy. This feature of the model is unaffected by our new shock, which changes volatilities but not levels at the self-confirming equilibrium.
Whether the mean dynamics converge to the self-confirming equilibrium depends on the local stability properties of the system of ordinary differential equations (3.5) -(3.6). A sufficient condition for stability is that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the system have negative real parts at the self-confirming equilibrium. (4) In Appendix A, we show that this reduces to a requirement that the eigenvalues ofR −1 Dḡ(γ ) have negative real parts. It will be satisfied iff (3.13) holds.
The system is asymptotically stable in the neighbourhood of the self-confirming equilibrium (4) Proposition 5.6, Evans and Honkapohja (2001, page 96). because condition (3.13) is never violated. The presence of inflation control errors ensures σ 2 2 > 0 and creates sufficient natural experiments to enable the government to 'learn' the structure of the economy, a property identified by El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993) as important for convergence. Furthermore, our new shock increases the slackness in condition (3.13), so once we re-introduce a motive for stabilisation policy the self-confirming equilibrium becomes more stable. Our new shocks complement the natural experiments created by inflation control errors, since they prompt stabilisation actions that create analogous unexpected inflation and unemployment movements.
The speed of convergence to self-confirming equilibrium also depends on the slackness in condition (3.13).
(5) Since our new shock increases slackness, it should make mean dynamics converge faster. The easiest way to verify this is through a numerical example. Following Cho,
Williams and Sargent (2002), we set u = 5, θ = 1 and σ 1 = σ 2 = 0.3, and assume that shocks W 1 and W 2 are Gaussian i.i.d. with mean zero and unit variance. We assume that our new shock W 3 has the same distribution as the other shocks, but set σ 3 = 0 for a model without the new shock and σ 3 ∈ (0.3, 0.6, 0.9) for models in which the new shock plays a progressively larger role.
Chart 2 shows a numerical example of how beliefs about the perceived structure of the economy converge with and without the new shock. Beliefs (γ 0 , γ 1 ) are initialised at (5, 0) to reflect the monetary policy makers' view at the beginning of the 1960s that policy was ineffective at reducing unemployment.
The top two lines of Chart 2 trace out the convergence of γ 0 to its self-confirming value u(1 + θ 2 ) = 10, reflecting increasing pessimism on the part of the monetary policy maker about the level of unemployment that would prevail if inflation were to be brought down. The bottom two lines show γ 1 converging to −θ = −1 as the monetary authority discovers the Phillips curve.
As expected, in both cases beliefs converge faster to the self-confirming equilibrium with the new shock in place.
Inflation and mean dynamics
The behaviour of inflation implied by mean dynamics can be derived from the definition of inflation (2.4) and the equation for government policy (2.11). From the perspective of private agents, expectations are formed before the new shock W 3 is known, so expected inflation and The level of inflation rises as the mean dynamics converge. Two forces are at work here, since both the perceived need for policy and the perceived effectiveness of policy increase along the convergence path. Higher absolute values of γ 0 and γ 1 create the (deluded) perception that high inflation is needed to reduce unemployment, and that high inflation is effective at reducing unemployment. The behaviour of inflation volatility in turn depends on the precise nature of the shocks in the economy. If there are no W 3 shocks then σ 3 = 0 and the only source of inflation volatility is the control error W 2 . The model collapses to that of Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) , with the volatility of inflation constant as mean dynamics converge. Once we introduce our new W 3 shock, the volatility of inflation becomes a function of the perceived effectiveness of policy γ 1 . The greater the perceived effectiveness the higher the volatility, since the monetary authority becomes increasingly tempted to use changes in inflation to offset the W 3 shocks to unemployment. Rising inflation volatility is then a natural consequence of mean dynamics converging to a point where policy is perceived to be effective. Once we add our new shock to the model, inflation and its volatility rise simultaneously as mean dynamics converge. This is not surprising since the level of inflation and its volatility have the same root cause in terms of the changing beliefs of the policymaker. We therefore have a partial answer to questions (i) and (ii) posed in the introduction. In our story, inflation and inflation volatility rose from the 1960s onwards because the monetary authority became increasingly convinced it could affect unemployment by changing inflation. The level of inflation went up as the monetary authority tried to bring down unemployment, whereas inflation volatility increased as the authorities attempted to use inflation to offset unemployment shocks and stabilise the economy. In these circumstances, an econometrician conditioning on the beliefs of private agents will identify a relationship between rising inflation and inflation volatility.
Falling inflation and inflation volatility
The fall in inflation and inflation volatility in the 1980s cannot be explained by the mean dynamics of the model. Instead, Sargent (1999) accounts for falling inflation by appealing to the model's ability to deviate from its mean dynamics in a significant and predictable way. In his view of the world, inflation fell because a rare sequence of shocks caused the government to abandon its belief that high inflation leads to lower unemployment. We follow this view, but in our story the rare sequence of shocks leads to a fall not just in inflation but also in inflation volatility. Once we re-introduce a motive for stabilisation policy, falling volatility becomes a natural consequence of the same changes in government beliefs that cause inflation to fall. As in the previous section, we obtain our results using the techniques of stochastic approximation to analyse the continuous time analogue of our model. We characterise the escape dynamics of the system and derive the way in which the model is most likely to deviate from its mean dynamics. In Section 5 we discuss corresponding simulations of escape dynamics in the discrete time model.
Escape dynamics
The question posed in escape dynamic analysis is what is the most likely path for beliefs if they deviate significantly (escape) from their mean dynamics. To answer this, we need a way of selecting the most likely path among all candidate escape paths. A natural metric is the likelihood function of the shocks needed to drive beliefs along each escape path. The path that minimises this function is the dominant escape path, representing the path of least resistance for beliefs to escape.
The formal analysis of escape dynamics in economic models is laid out in the pioneering work of Williams (2001) , where the dominant escape path is characterised by solving an optimal control problem. The method involves choosing a series of perturbations to mean dynamics that is most likely to cause beliefs to escape from a neighbourhood around the self-confirming equilibrium.
Mathematically, the dominant escape path is given by the solution to optimal control problem
The optimal control problem works by perturbing the mean dynamics of the model 
Dominant escape path
The dominant escape path solves optimal control problem (4.1). To find the solution we define the Hamiltonian (4.2), where a and λ are co-state vectors for the evolution of γ and R.
The Hamiltonian is convex so first-order conditions (4.3) -(4.6) necessarily hold along the (6) An analytical expression for Q(γ , R) is given in Appendix B.
dominant escape path.γ 
The dominant escape path in the model without our new shock is similar to the escape path in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) . (8) Beliefs spend a long time near the self-confirming equilibrium before escaping rapidly at t ≈ 6.5 to new values close to (γ 0 , γ 1 ) = (5, 0). The mechanism causing beliefs to escape is the same as in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) .
Intuitively, an escape happens when a sequence of shocks makes the monetary authorities (7) We thank Noah Williams for generously providing us with matlab codes to solve the static model in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) . Following his lead, we simplify the calculations by setting the initial values of the second co-state vector λ to zero. Our extension of the code to allow for the new shock is available from the authors on request. The re-introduction of a motive for stabilisation policy has a clear effect on the dominant escape paths in Chart 4, with the escape occurring later as the new W 3 shock plays an increasingly important role. When σ 3 = 0.9 the escape is at t ≈ 10.1, about 55% later than in the model without the new shock. The reason for the delay is that the new shock increases the complexity of the sequence of shocks needed to trigger an escape. In the model with three shocks, we need the unemployment shock W 1 not only to offset the effect of the inflation control errors W 2 but also to offset the change in unemployment brought about by the monetary authorities' reaction to the new shock W 3 . Only then will unemployment appear stable as inflation varies. The more complex the sequence of shocks needed the less likely it is to occur, so the longer we have to wait for the policymakers' doubts to surface and the later the escape occurs.
Taken literally, our analysis suggests an economy is more likely to escape in periods when the variance of shocks that can be stabilised is relatively small. This result contributes to a literature that attempts to explain the timing of escapes, a question not addressed in Sargent (1999) . The most important contributions in this literature to date are by Gerali and Lippi (2002) and McGough (2005) , who demonstrate that escapes are more likely in periods when the policymaker is less inflation averse or when there are favourable shocks to the natural rate of unemployment.
Inflation and escape dynamics
The behaviour of inflation over an escape episode is determined by the definition of inflation (2.4) and the equation for monetary policy (2.11). As in the mean dynamics analysis of Section 3.3, we take the perspective of private agents and calculate expected inflation and expected inflation volatility using equations (3.14) and (3.15). Chart 5 plots the evolution of inflation and inflation volatility implied by escaping beliefs.
In the top panel, the level of inflation falls rapidly as beliefs escape. At the time of the escape, increasing doubts about whether high inflation can reduce unemployment (ie falling γ 1 ) cause the government to abandon its high-inflation policy in favour of setting inflation close to zero. The same escape occurs in models with and without the new shock, but with different timing. In the bottom panel, inflation volatility is constant in the model without the new shock but otherwise falls at the time of the escape. For models with the new shock, the escape affects inflation volatility because the doubts that cause the monetary policy maker to abandon its high-inflation policy also lead it to give up on stabilisation policy. The incentive to use inflation to stabilise shocks disappears and the volatility of inflation escapes to the level implied by inflation control errors.
Our model with the new shock offers a natural explanation for why both inflation and inflation volatility fell in the 1980s, completing our answer to the questions posed in the introduction.
According to our story, inflation and its volatility fell in an escape episode when a rare sequence of shocks triggered a dramatic change in beliefs on the part of the monetary authorities. The escape reversed the increases in inflation and inflation volatility seen in the 1960s. An econometrician conditioning on the beliefs of private agents will identify the same positive correlation between 
Mean and escape dynamics in simulations
The results obtained in previous sections describe the behaviour of the economy as the gain in the learning mechanism tends to zero. In this section, we revisit models in discrete time with positive but small gain parameters (which are required to generate economically significant fluctuations in volatility). The return to discrete time precludes further analytical results, so we resort to simulations to characterise the models. We report results separately for simulated mean and escape dynamics.
Mean dynamics
The mean dynamics of the model determine the speed at which beliefs converge to the self-confirming equilibrium. To capture this feature in simulations, we initialise beliefs (γ 0 , γ 1 ) at (0, 5) and simulate the model until beliefs return to a small neighbourhood of their self-confirming values (−1, 10).
(9) Table A shows the average time to return to equilibrium in 1,000 such simulations. The numbers in parentheses are 90% confidence intervals.
(9) We define a small neighbourhood as beliefs being at most 0.1 Euclidean units away from their self-confirming values. Simulations in which beliefs escape before entering the neighbourhood are ignored. (2355, 3512) 0.0100 2790 (2426, 3193) 2611 (2256, 3031) 2363 (1984, 2970) 2045 (1716, 2525) The simulation results confirm the prediction of Section 3.2 that re-introducing a motive for stabilisation increases the speed of convergence of mean dynamics. For each value of the gain parameter ε, beliefs converge faster when σ 3 is increased to give more prominence to the new shock in the model. Increasing σ 3 from 0 to (0.3, 0.6, 0.9) reduces the average convergence time by on average (4%, 17%, 29%). Higher values of the gain parameter ε lead to faster convergence to self-confirming equilibrium. A higher gain reduces the weight the monetary policy maker places on past data, so initial beliefs are 'forgotten' quicker.
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The behaviour of inflation and inflation volatility implied by mean dynamics was predicted in Section 3.3. Accordingly, there should be a positive correlation between expected inflation and expected inflation volatility once we re-introduce a motive for stabilisation policy. We verify this by noting that the correlation between expected inflation and expected inflation volatility exceeds 0.94 in all simulations where the new shock plays a role. If the new shock is absent then the correlation is zero.
Escape dynamics
The escape dynamic analysis in Section 4 identifies the most likely path beliefs will take if they deviate significantly from the mean dynamics. To map the dominant escape path results into simulations, we initialise beliefs (γ 0 , γ 1 ) at the self-confirming equilibrium values (10, −1) and simulate the model until beliefs deviate significantly from their initial values. (10) confidence intervals are in parentheses. Times to first escape in simulations validate the predictions of Section 4.2. The dependence of the dominant escape path on the degree of stabilisation incentives is mirrored in the longer times to first escape seen as our new shock becomes more important. A predicted extra delay of 55% in the dominant escape path for the case σ 3 = 0.9 translates into an average 58% delay in the (logarithmic) time to first escape in simulations. (11) As expected, times to first escape fall as the gain parameter rises and the monetary policy maker places less weight on past data.
In Section 4.3, the correlation between expected inflation and expected inflation volatility becomes positive if we re-introduce stabilisation policy along the dominant escape path. This prediction is corroborated by simulation evidence, since the correlation between expected inflation and expected inflation volatility is greater than 0.63 for all simulations with σ 3 > 0. If σ 3 = 0 the correlation is zero.
Conclusions
At the beginning of this paper, we set ourselves the challenge of explaining why inflation was so high and volatile in the 1970s. Our response is built on the work of Sargent (1999) , and shows that changing beliefs on the part of the monetary policy maker can explain the observed behaviour of inflation and inflation volatility from the 1960s to the 1990s. The story articulated in Sargent's
The conquest of American inflation attributes the rise and fall in inflation to the discovery and (11) The translation from continuous time t to discrete time n is given by t = log n ≈ log S 0 +S/ε, see Williams (2001) .
subsequent disappearance of the Phillips curve, but is mute on why inflation volatility changes at the same time. To complete the story, we relax one of the simplifications in Sargent (1999) and restore the ability of the monetary authorities to react to some of the shocks hitting the economy.
In this case, the discovery of the Phillips curve in the 1960s not only tempts the policymaker to raise inflation to reduce unemployment, but also promotes inflation volatility as there is now an incentive to let inflation vary to offset unemployment shocks. Conversely, the disappearance of the Phillips curve in the 1980s leads the monetary authorities to abandon their high and volatile inflation policy. In our story, the rise and fall in inflation volatility is therefore intrinsically linked to the same changing beliefs that cause inflation to rise and fall.
Why inflation fell at the time it did in the 1980s is only partially explained by Sargent (1999) .
According to his story, inflation fell due to a rare sequence of shocks that triggered doubts about the existence of a Phillips curve. These doubts were self-confirming in the short run, so the high inflation policy was rapidly abandoned and the Phillips curve disappeared. This application of escape dynamics can explain the fall in inflation, but the question remains of why the rare sequence of shocks that triggered the escape occurred at the time it did. Our paper sheds some light on this. We show that an escape to low inflation is much more likely if there are relatively few shocks that the monetary authority can react to. Taken literally, this suggests that the fall in inflation in the 1980s may have been precipitated by a fall in the variance of shocks motivating stabilisation policy. In this respect, we complement the papers by Gerali and Lippi (2002) and McGough (2005) that attempt to explain the timing of escape episodes.
Of course, we have to be wary of taking our model too literally, just as we would exercise similar caution reading The conquest of American inflation. The title of that book is ironic, since Sargent's model suggests that inflation will rise again when the long-run trade-off looks more favourable. Similarly, taken literally, our model suggests that inflation and inflation volatility will rise again. What both models miss out is the revolution in institutional design, and in the economic understanding which underpins monetary policy. These developments will invalidate the gloomy predictions that Sargent's model, and our modification to it, make for the future. When evaluated at the SCE, the Jacobian is given by (A.2).
The matrix of zeros off the leading diagonal gives the Jacobian a block recursive structure, implying that its eigenvalues are equal to the eigenvalues of the matrices on the leading diagonal.
The eigenvalues of −I trivially have negative real parts, so the stability properties of the SCE depend on the eigenvalues ofR −1 Dḡ(γ ) evaluated at equilibrium. After simple but tedious calculations,R −1 Dḡ(γ ) at the SCE takes the form of equation (A.3) providedR is invertible. All eigenvalues of the system therefore have negative real parts and the system is asymptotically stable as long asR is invertible. Invertibility ofR requires a non-zero determinant of the matrix in equation (3.8), so a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the self-confirming equilibrium is (A.6). 
